Hans-JoachimPetscheGraßmann2006BirkhäuserBasel, Boston, Berlin978-3-7643-7257-6326 pp. $89.95  by Lewis, Albert C.
82 Reviews / Historia Mathematica 36 (2009) 73–89
the author’s criticisms of Russell, Couturat, and Cassirer we are provided more with a juxtaposition of textual passages
than a precise account of historical developments. This is all the more surprising as many of the texts documenting
Leibniz’s philosophical and mathematical development in the period under discussion have now been published in the
Akademie-Ausgabe.
This problem is reflected in some of the assertions Cirino makes on the emergence of the mathematical concept of
the infinitesimal in Paris. While it is certainly correct that the philosophical ideas on indivisibles that Leibniz worked
out in Mainz laid the foundation for the mathematical concept, it is all too easy simply to claim that the former led
to the latter (p. 206). Admittedly, the author suggests that Leibniz received decisive impulses through reading the
mathematical work of John Wallis, but this is surely mistaken. By the time Leibniz came to read Wallis in Paris,
he had already developed his concept of infinitesimal and was indeed extremely critical of Wallis’s employment of
interpolation and what the Oxford mathematician called induction. The only significant praise he now gave to Wallis
in a mathematical context was on account of his having arithmetized the method of Cavalieri. As far as infinitesimals
are concerned, Leibniz’s concept is quite different from that of the infinitely small in Wallis, who employed these
indivisible elements in a strictly compositional sense in works such as De sectionibus conicis and Arithmetica infinito-
rum (see p. 212). Similarly, it is by no means clear, as Cirino suggests, that metaphysical deliberations on infinity had
any decisive impact on the formulation of mathematical ideas (p. 259f). Leibniz repeatedly asserted that questions on
the nature of infinity were for metaphysicians to discuss, not for mathematicians whose approach is altogether more
utilitarian in nature.
The author is on firmer ground when talking about metaphysics and the passage from motion to force. He discusses
the role played by final causes in Leibniz’s work on optics (p. 125), and his establishment of the law of the equivalence
between the full cause and the complete effect in contrast to Descartes’s principle of the conservation of motion
(p. 136). Moreover, by seeing the concept of substantial form from a dynamical point of view, Leibniz was able to
pass to a quantitative measure of force, relative to its effect, from the estimation of its proximate cause as a single
qualitative element. In this respect, the author correctly ascribes the infinitesimal calculus a central role, since it
serves as a methodological vehicle that describes the minimal mechanism of motion and as such is able to lead us
from motion to force, and thus to the simple substance concept at the core of Leibniz’s metaphysics (p. 139). It is
here that the insufficiency of Couturat’s interpretation becomes apparent on Cirino’s view. The true mathematics, to
which Leibniz refers, through which the concept of force is considered, is that of infinitesimals. And this does not
correspond, as Cirino believes he has shown, to a rigorous logic of the formal kind, but pertains rather to metaphysics
and the logic or probability (pp. 148, 183, 289).
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Grassmann, one the mathematical geniuses of the nineteenth century, among his many accomplishments estab-
lished linear algebra with his Ausdehnungslehre, or calculus of extension, of 1844. His work on the latter was largely
overlooked during his lifetime because it was ahead of its time and presented in a way that contemporaries found
difficult to follow. The unclear cause of this difficulty, coupled with the dramatic description some later commentators
gave of Grassmann’s suffering from rejection, were major appeals for making the 1844 Ausdehnungslehre the sub-
ject of my 1975 doctoral thesis. Until the appearance of the present book by Petsche, based on his 1979 dissertation,
I was unaware that anyone else was also attracted to this topic in the 1970s. The international group of historians of
mathematics was not that large and I knew many of the members of that group in Germany, at least in West Germany.
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Petsche, however, was in Potsdam in East Germany and we remained ignorant of each other’s work until recently.
We both visited Grassmann’s home city Szczecin in Poland (or Stettin in Prussia as it was before 1945), within a
year or two of each other to discover what few traces existed of Grassmann in that notable city. This was a lesson
for me: as historians we sometimes puzzle over near simultaneous but seemingly independent discoveries in mathe-
matics in earlier periods but this personal example illustrates how easy it can be to underestimate the importance of
national and political barriers to communication. While correspondence and visits did take place between East and
West before official German reunification in 1990, evidently the effects were not equally distributed within each side;
for example only a few institutions in East Germany might regularly receive a history of science journal from the
West.
Petsche in the book under review updates his dissertation taking into account the literature published since then by
others. It is the most substantial publication on Grassmann since the conference proceedings (Schubring, 1996). Prac-
tically all the extant sources on Grassmann’s life, it should be noted, are contained in one work, namely (Grassmann,
1894–1911) which includes in its last volume a biography, critical bibliography and catalogue of Nachlass. Since the
Nachlass seems not to have survived the First World War this collected works edition in effect takes the place of
original sources. Fortunately, thanks to the initiative of Felix Klein, an editorial team led by Friedrich Engel produced
an example of scholarly editing at its best. In the biography Engel quotes extensively from letters and other documents
in the Nachlass to produce a work of considerable detail and depth. In the absence of new material a new biography
in German might appear superfluous.
The first half of Petsche’s account is devoted to Grassmann’s personal history: his family background, upbringing,
education, and teaching career. This necessarily relies heavily on Engel who not only had the original documents but
who also drew upon a number of those who knew Grassmann as a colleague, teacher and father. The only drawback
to this for Engel was perhaps a certain loss of objectivity. Petsche’s major contribution in this biographical part is a
wider perspective than Engel’s. This is most evident in his overview of the environment of the Grassmanns’ life in
Stettin. This is important for filling in a picture of the brothers Hermann and Robert, for example, who participated
in the revolutionary events of 1848, at least to the extent of publishing a newspaper in support of their views. In
this connection Petsche quotes Karl Marx several times and gives central attention to the economic and political
environment of Stettin as formative of the Grassmanns’ approach to their work. These references might remind a
reader—at least one of a certain age—of what was deemed by pre-unification Western readers to be window-dressing
obeisance to Marxian ideology on the part of historians in the East. In 1848, however, Marx published the Communist
Manifesto and his observations of the tumultuous happenings of that period are an appropriate and interesting contrast
to the views of the Grassmanns. Petsche’s account is decidedly not an economic reductionist one.
We follow Grassmann through his university years in Berlin where he studied a range of subjects in the humanities
and where his focus, apparently attracted by many different subjects, shifted from theology to philology. Here he came
under the influence of Schleiermacher. On returning to Stettin in 1830 in various minor teaching roles he prepared for
the teaching and theological examinations, and resumed mathematical studies. The work submitted for his teaching
examination in 1839, on the theory of tides, displayed already some of the key ideas which were to lead to his
founding of linear algebra. All of this was based largely on his self-taught knowledge of mathematics obtained under
the general guidance of his father. To the extent this allowed his originality to flourish this might have been a source
of strength; on the other hand it might have led to his work not being as well communicated to the mathematical
community. In any case his father, Justus, a fascinating figure in his own right, presaged in his work in physics and
mathematics much of what Grassmann would do. Petsche is able to add new personal touches such as the fact that
Justus was the only teacher at his school to take part in the newly founded Stettin branch of the politically charged
Turnverein.
This biographical section includes the Ausdehnungslehre of 1844 from an external point of view: the work that
led up to it, its immediate reception (or rather non-reception), Grassmann’s publications to propagate the usefulness
of this “new branch of mathematics” as he deemed it, and its gradual acknowledgment by others. The one high
point in this early reception was the prize he won from submitting a spin-off work linking his geometric calculus
to Leibniz’s geometrical characteristic. A fair amount of attention is given to Grassmann’s post-Ausdehnungslehre
work in the fields of acoustics, electromagnetism, color theory, and linguistics. The fact that in each of these fields
there is now a “Grassmann Law” indicates that these were non-trivial contributions. More might have been said but
Petsche’s ultimate focus is on the mathematics though even in this relatively little is said about his ground-breaking
1860 Lehrbuch der Arithmetik.
84 Reviews / Historia Mathematica 36 (2009) 73–89
Before turning to the Ausdehnungslehre the father, Justus, and brother, Robert, receive substantial treatment. This
also marks the beginning in the book of the more original contributions that go beyond the earlier biography by Engel.
This emphasis on Justus and Robert is well-deserved and no surprise to anyone who has looked at their publications.
Robert is given credit by Hermann for aspects of the Ausdehnungslehre and, though Robert turned more to logic and
metaphysics in his own works, the continuing mutual influence between the brothers is clear. However, Justus was
evidently the main mathematical influence on Hermann in his younger years and one can see the beginnings of most
of the initial concepts of the Ausdehnungslehre in the father’s works on number theory, crystallography, “theory of
space” (Raumlehre), and combinatorics. Though Justus’s importance has been noted by previous historians, Petsche is
the first to publish a detailed analysis of these works, which appeared between 1817 and 1835, and demonstrate their
relevance to the Ausdehnungslehre. There is somewhat more said about the pedagogical and philosophical aspects than
about the mathematics. This may be justified since one cannot cover everything and in most cases the mathematical
connections are clear enough, whereas delineating the influences with Kant, J. Fries, Schleiermacher, Pestalozzi, and
others is less straightforward, and Petsche’s analysis sheds new light on these latter connections. Still it is worth noting
that there could be additional insights into Hermann’s mathematical innovations through Justus’s work. For example
Lewis [1997] cites hints of the conceptual origins of Hermann’s move beyond three dimensions in passages from an
1827 work by Justus. Nevertheless the main point is successfully made that Justus and his sons Robert and Hermann
generate a rich field for exploration into the mathematical, philosophical, pedagogical, and logical world of their time
and place.
Robert and Hermann read Schleiermacher’s Dialektik in 1840 not long after its publication. Engel seems to
link this only to their joint work on a German language textbook in 1841. Petsche recognizes that the Dialek-
tik is a major influence on precisely those parts of the Ausdehnungslehre that contain some of Grassmann’s most
original foundational contributions, which at the same time appear to be the aspects most to have confounded
readers of the 1844 edition. Petsche devotes a substantial section to Schleiermacher’s life (1768–1834) and work
including his political views and mentions the contrast with his enemy Hegel. The Dialektik is described and
Schleiermacher’s goals therein: to strengthen support for the rational content of the Schelling school of Natur-
philosophie through a synthesis of Kant, Spinoza, and Plato. The heart of this second part of the book is an ex-
plication of Schleiermacher’s influence, and of the Dialektik in particular, on the Ausdehnungslehre. Making this
connection—not just with the more philosophical parts but also the mathematical—requires attentive reading of
the text as well as awareness of the intellectual environment. Grassmann may not have intended to hide this con-
nection but he certainly did not make it explicit and it was unrecognized by most of the readers that we know
about.
Petsche generously acknowledges my priority in publishing an analysis of this relationship to Schleiermacher in
1977, but adds information that lends further support to this connection that has had one or two doubters among Grass-
mann aficionados. Rather than his father, Justus, being an altogether independent influence on Grassmann, Petsche
has found, for one thing, that Justus, through his circle of friends, was afforded the opportunity to study Schleierma-
cher’s Dialektik lecture notes as early as 1816 or soon thereafter. (The posthumous 1839 edition read by Robert and
Hermann was the first published edition.) Such influence from the Dialektik would explain a number of foundational
similarities between the father’s early works and the Ausdehnungslehre. With this additional evidence Petsche is able
to plot richer connections than heretofore from Kant, through Justus Grassmann and Schleiermacher to Hermann
Grassmann with subsidiary lines of influence from others as well. The key notions as developed by the Grassmanns
are linked in turn to late twentieth century constructivist theses of which the philosophy of P. Lorenzen is taken as a
representative.
It is heartening to see this new biography and to have it appear in time for Grassmann’s bicentennial in 2009.
Hopefully it will soon be translated into English.
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Of the Human Heart: A Biography of Benjamin Peirce
By Edward R. Hogan. Bethlehem (Lehigh University Press). 2008. ISBN 978-0-934223-93-5, 429 pp. $80.00
Readers of Historia Mathematica will know Edward R. Hogan for his articles on 19th-century American math-
ematics covering men such as George Baron, Robert Adrain, and Theodore Strong. Hogan, now retired from East
Stroudsburg University, has produced a biography of Benjamin Peirce quite unlike his articles in this journal. In con-
trast to I. Bernard Cohen’s scientific biography of Peirce [Cohen, 1980], Hogan takes a much more personal approach
in his work. Hogan utilizes letters exchanged between Peirce and his scientific friends—most notably Alexander Dal-
las Bache—as well as correspondence between Peirce and family members like his wife Sara, to reconstruct a life
dedicated to building a nascent community of professional scientists in the United States.
Hogan calls his work a “documentary biography” (p. 10). He tells us that his decision to relate Peirce’s life story
through his own correspondence is at least partially due to Peirce’s desire, as related in a letter to Bache, to be
saved from “eulogistic biographers” (p. 9). Although there are places in the book in which lengthy quotes from this
correspondence interfere with the flow of the story, the overall result is an interesting and very personal look at the
changing face of American science throughout a large portion of the 19th century.
Of the Human Heart begins in the middle of Peirce’s career, with the relatively unknown Harvard as-
tronomer/mathematician announcing to the world that the discovery of Neptune—an event trumpeted by the world’s
scientists as a shining example of the predictive powers of 19th-century celestial mechanics—was little more than
blind luck! Peirce caused a major stir in the world scientific community by claiming that the predictions made by
Urbain Jean Joseph Le Verrier and John Couch Adams as to the location of Neptune’s orbit—predictions based on the
perturbations of the orbit of Uranus—did not actually agree with the discovery of Neptune made by Johann Gottfried
Galle. As might be expected, Le Verrier was incensed that the American would question his role in this important dis-
covery. Surprisingly, some in the American scientific community were equally appalled that Peirce had the audacity
to challenge the French mathematician. All told, however, the majority of American scientists were proud of Peirce’s
role in the dispute, fueled no doubt by the support he received from Gauss who confirmed Peirce’s claim that Galle’s
discovery had been a “happy accident” (p. 19).
The Neptune incident actually marks one of the few places in Hogan’s book that directly addresses Peirce’s sci-
entific or mathematical work. Later, the author does discuss in some small detail Peirce’s two major contributions to
mathematics: a criterion for rejecting outliers in a data set and his work in algebra culminating in his Linear Associa-
tive Algebra of 1870. In particular, Hogan details Peirce’s path to this important work in algebra, its warm reception
in England and the cool reaction of German mathematicians, and even the hesitant way in which it was praised by
Americans unable to grasp its significance. Louis Agassiz, the Swiss-American naturalist and geologist, comment-
ing after a presentation by Peirce to the National Academy of Sciences, had this to say about the mathematician’s
work:
